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TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS: A PLEA FOR MODESTY 
 
Robert Stern 
 
Abstract: A modest transcendental argument is one that sets out merely to 
establish how things must appear to us or how we must believe them to be, 
UDWKHU WKDQ KRZ WKLQJV DUH 6WURXG¶V FODLP WR KDve established that all 
transcendental arguments must be modest in this way is criticised and 
rejected. However, a different case for why we should abandon ambitious 
transcendental arguments is presented: namely, that when it comes to 
establishing claims about how things are, there is no reason to prefer 
transcendental arguments to arguments that rely on the evidence of the 
senses, making the former redundant in a way that modest transcendental 
arguments, which have a different kind of sceptical target, are not.  
 
 µ>,I@DQ\PDQZHUHIRXQGRIVRVWUDQJHDWXUQDVQRWWREHOLHYHKLVRZQ
eyes, to put no trust in his senses, nor have the least regard to their 
testimony, would any man think it worth while to reason gravely with such 
a person, and, by argument, to convince him of his error? Surely no wise 
PDQZRXOG¶5HLG 
 
Although it has never been an issue quite at the centre of recent epistemology, the 
promise and potential of transcendental arguments has received a good deal of 
discussion.1 Up until now, the main focus of that discussion has been whether such 
arguments work, and in particular whether they can be used successfully to establish 
certain facts about the world in a sceptic-SURRI PDQQHU ZKHUH %DUU\ 6WURXG¶V
influential paper from 1968 has persuaded many that they cannot.2 I want to suggest 
here, however, that the argument of this paper is not as persuasive as is widely 
supposed. Nonetheless, I will claim, there is another way of criticising transcendental 
arguments to the same effect, which is to show that our hopes for such arguments 
should be modest and not ambitious. I will begin by sketching what I take 
                                                 
1
 For a bibliography, see Stern 1999: 307-21. 
2
 I will refer to the reprinted version in Stroud 2000: 9-6WURXG¶VZDVQRWWKHRQO\FULWLFDOYRLFHIURP
this period: another significant critic of transcendental arguments was Stephan Körner; see for example 
Körner  1967. 
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WUDQVFHQGHQWDO DUJXPHQWV WREH DQG WKHQFRQVLGHU6WURXG¶V FULWLTXHRI WKHPEHIRUH
criticising this and offering an argument for modesty of my own. That argument 
hinges on whether there is any reason to prefer a transcendental argument as a 
response to scepticism over some other sort of response, for example, one that relies 
on the evidence of our senses? I will argue that in the ambitious way these arguments 
are commonly conceived, against the sceptic who is commonly taken to be their 
target, there is no reason to so prefer them; but if our conception of these arguments is 
made more modest, there is room to think they offer us something additional to other 
anti-sceptical manoeuvres, and so that it is here that their main value should be seen to 
lie. 
 
 
I 
 
While the exact nature of transcendental arguments is far from unproblematic, they 
are generally taken to have the following features: They begin from some sort of self-
evident starting point concerning our nature as subjects (for example, that we have 
experiences of a certain kind, or beliefs of a certain kind, or make utterances of a 
certain kind) which the sceptic can be expected to accept, and then proceed to show 
that this starting point has certain metaphysically necessary conditions, where in 
establishing that these conditions obtain, the sceptic is thereby refuted. So, in the face 
of the sceptical suggestion that we do not know that there is an external world, or 
other minds, or the past, a transcendental argument might be offered to provide 
deductive support for these claims from certain facts about our nature as subjects, 
based on the premise that the former are necessary conditions for the latter, where the 
form of the argument is: we have certain experiences etc; a necessary condition for us 
having these experiences etc is the truth of S; therefore S. 
 However, it is now widely held that this kind of argument is more problematic 
than it may at first appear. A highly influential source of this suspicion is Barry 
6WURXGZKR LQKLV DUWLFOH µ7UDQVFHQGHQWDO$UJXPHQWV¶ VXJJHVWHG WKDW IRU DQ\FODLP
concerning the necessary condition S µWKH VFHSWLF FDQ DOZD\V YHU\ SODXVLEO\ LQVLVW
that it is enough [that] we believe that S is true, or [that] it looks for all the world as if 
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it is, but that S QHHGQ¶W DFWXDOO\ EH WUXH¶ 6WURXG  3 So, in the case of the 
problem of the external world, for example, the concern is that no argument can be 
constructed to show that there must actually be an external world, but just that there 
must appear to us to be one, or that we must believe there to be one. 
 ,QVXEVHTXHQWZRUN6WURXGKDVJRQHRQWRH[SODLQZK\WKHVFHSWLFFDQµYHU\
SODXVLEO\¶ ZHDNHQ Whe necessary condition for experience etc from S WR µZH PXVW
believe S¶RUµS PXVWDSSHDUWREHWUXH¶)RUZKLOHKHDOORZVWKDWZHPLJKWUHDVRQDEO\
EH DEOH WR PDNH PRGDO FODLPV DERXW µKRZ RXU WKLQNLQJ LQ FHUWDLQ ZD\V QHFHVVDULO\
requires that we also thinN LQ FHUWDLQ RWKHU ZD\V¶ KH WKLQNV LW LV SX]]OLQJ
µKRZ«WUXWKV DERXW WKH ZRUOG ZKLFK DSSHDU WR VD\ RU LPSO\ QRWKLQJ DERXW KXPDQ
WKRXJKWRUH[SHULHQFH¶IRUH[DPSOHWKDWWKLQJVH[LVWRXWVLGHXVLQVSDFHDQGWLPHRU
WKDW WKHUHDUHRWKHUPLQGVµ>FDQ@EHVKown to be genuinely necessary conditions of 
such psychological facts as that we think and experience things in certain ways, from 
ZKLFKWKHSURRIVEHJLQ¶6WURXGJRHVRQµ,WZRXOGVHHPWKDWZHPXVWILQGDQGFURVV
a bridge of necessity from the one to the other. That would be a truly remarkable feat, 
and some convincing explanation would surely be needed of how the whole thing is 
SRVVLEOH¶ 6WURXG  -9).4 Thus, Stroud is prepared to allow (and indeed 
exploits our capacity himself, in his own arguments against the sceptic)5 µWKDWZHFDQ
come to see how our thinking in certain ways necessarily requires that we also think 
in certain other ways, and so perhaps in certain other ways as well, and we can 
appreciate how rich and complicated the relations between those ways of thinking 
PXVWEH¶ 6WURXG-9); but he believes that anything more than this, which 
DVVHUWVWKDWµQRQ-SV\FKRORJLFDOIDFWV¶DERXWWKHZRUOGRXWVLGHXVFRQVWLWXWHQHFHVVDU\
conditions for our thinking, is problematic. 
 Faced with 6WURXG¶VFKDOOHQJHLWKDVDSSHDUHGWKDWWKHUHDUHWKUHHZD\VWRJR
First, one can opt for idealism, which sees no gap to bridge between how we think and 
                                                 
3
 ,QWKLVµ7UDQVFHQGHQWDO$UJXPHQWV¶ paper, the starting point for which S is meant to be a necessary 
condition is language, where if the transcendental claim could be established, S could be shown to be 
true from the fact that what the sceptic says makes sense. But, as many transcendental arguments have 
EHHQSURSRVHGWKDWDUHQRWMXVWIRFXVVHGRQWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUODQJXDJH,WDNHLWWKDW6WURXG¶VZRUU\
here cannot just apply to transcendental arguments of this sort, but also those that focus on conditions 
for experience, self-consciousness etc. 
4
 &IDOVR6WURXGSµ$OOWKLVZRXOGEHVRRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWUDQVFHQGHQWDODUJXPHQWV
deduce the truth of certain conclusions about the world from our thinking or experiencing things in 
certain ways. That strong condition of success is what I continue to see as the stumbling-block for such 
ambitious transcendental arguments. Can we ever really reach such conclusions from such 
EHJLQQLQJV"«>7KHPRVWWURXEOLQJGDQJHULV@WKDWRIQRWEHLQJDEOHWRUHDFKVXEVWDQWLYHQRQ-
psychological trutKVIURPSUHPLVHVRQO\DERXWRXUWKLQNLQJRUH[SHULHQFLQJWKLQJVLQFHUWDLQZD\V¶ 
5
 See, for example, Stroud 2000: 165 ff. 
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how things are insofar as the former determines the latter, and then try to qualify this 
position in such a way as to render it somehow plausible. Second, one can opt for 
verificationism, which stipulates that some of what we believe about the world must 
be true. But both these options are seen as problematic in themselves, and as 
sufficiently anti-sceptical on their own to make any appeal to transcendental 
arguments redundant. A third possibility, however, it to opt for what can be seen as a 
PRUH µPRGHVW¶ DSSURDFK 2Q WKLV YLHZ LW KDV EHHQ VXJJHVWHG WKDW ZH DFFHSW WKDW
transcendental arguments should not DWWHPSWWRFURVV6WURXG¶VµEULGJHRIQHFHVVLW\¶DW
all; instead, we should allow that the only necessary conditions that we can establish 
FRQFHUQKRZZHPXVWWKLQNRUKRZWKLQJVPXVWDSSHDUWRXVWKXVDYRLGLQJ6WURXG¶V
call for an explanation of how we cDQ JHW IURP WKH µSV\FKRORJLFDO¶ WR WKH µQRQ-
SV\FKRORJLFDO¶E\UHPDLQLQJZLWKLQWKHIRUPHUDQGHVFKHZLQJFODLPVDERXWWKHODWWHU
6WURXG¶V RZQ SRVLWLRQ YL]-à-viz the sceptic involves this sort of modest approach, 
although there are other ways to take it. 
 +RZHYHU EHIRUH DGRSWLQJ DQ\ VXFK µPRGHVW¶ VWUDWHJ\ WKH TXHVWLRQ VKRXOG
QRZEHDVNHGKRZSRZHUIXO LV6WURXG¶VSRVLWLRQKHUH" , WKLQN LW LV OHVVFRPSHOOLQJ
than is generally supposed.6 For, according to Stroud, there is something inherently 
problematic in making a modal claim about how the world must be as a condition for 
our thought or experience, but there is not anything particularly problematic about 
making a claim about our thought or experience being a condition for some other 
aspect of our thought or experience. But why should it be somehow easier to make 
modal claims between ways of thinking or types of experience, than ways of thinking 
RUW\SHVRIH[SHULHQFHDQGWKHZRUOG":K\DUHVXFKµEULGJHV¶RUPRGDOFRQQHFWLRQV
HDVLHUWRPDNHµZLWKLQWKRXJKW¶than between how we think and how the world must 
be to make that thought possible? Of course, one might take this symmetry between 
the two to be reason to be suspicious of modal claims of this sort at any level: but as 
we have seen, Stroud himself seems to WKLQNWKH\DUHYLDEOHEHWZHHQµSV\FKRORJLFDO
IDFWV¶7 If so, I believe, he needs to give us some account of why they are less 
                                                 
6
 :KLOVWLWLVFRPPRQO\WDNHQDVDVWDUWLQJSRLQW6WURXG¶VSRVLWLRQKDVRIFRXUVHQRWJRQHWRWDOO\
uncriticised: see e.g. Glock 2003: 37-*ORFNFLWHVDQDQWLFLSDWLRQRI6WURXG¶VSRVLWLRQIURPWKH
OHFWXUHVRI&'%URDGµ:KDW.DQWFODLPVWRSURYHE\KLVWUDQVFHQGHQWDODUJXPHQWVLVWKDWFHUWDLQ
propositions, such as the law of causation and the persistence of substance, are true with the 
interpretation and within the range he gives them. But it is doubtful whether his arguments could prove 
more than that all human beings must believe them to be true, or must act as if they believed them to be 
WUXH¶%URDG%URDGJLYHVQRUHason to substantiate his doubt here. 
7
 Cf. Stroud 2000: 224-44, where Stroud defends the possibility of modal knowledge but still only 
FRQVLGHUVPRGDOFODLPVLQYROYLQJµSV\FKRORJLFDOIDFWV¶VXFKDVWKDWµWKLQNLQJRIWKHZRUOGDV
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problematic here than between our thought and the world; but as far as I can see he 
just takes it to be obvious, and so provides no such account. 
 Perhaps, however, it could be said that Stroud is right to take this to be 
obvious: for, if we are dealing with modal connections between us and the world, and 
the world is conceived in a realist manner, as independent of us, then of course we 
know less about how we depend on the world than on how we depend on other facts 
about us ± this is just a feature of the mind-independence of the world, which makes it 
more opaque to us in this way, so that our modal claims concerning it are 
correspondingly more problematic, than they are concerning connections between our 
ways of thinking. 
 Now, of course, it is often taken to be the case that self-knowledge 
NQRZOHGJH RI RXU µLQQHU VWDWHV¶ LV OHVV SUREOHPDWLF WKDQ ZRUOGO\ NQRZOHGJH RQ
these sorts RI JURXQGV DQG 6WURXG¶V SRVLWLRQ PD\ EH WDNHQ WR EH WUDGLQJ RQ WKDW
intuition. But if so, I think it is mistaken. For, even if we grant that certain sorts of 
self-knowledge are unproblematic in this way, on grounds of their immediacy or self-
evidence or infallibility, it seems unlikely that the modal claims involved in 
transcendental arguments would have these features, even if they involve merely 
µSV\FKRORJLFDO IDFWV¶ UDWKHU WKDQ FODLPV DERXW WKH ZRUOG ,I ZH PDNH VRPH VRUW RI
claim regarding the dependence of one aspect of our thought or experience on some 
other aspect of our thought or experience, what reason have we for thinking this is 
somehow self-HYLGHQWRU LPPHGLDWH LQ WKHZD\ WKDW SHUKDSVµ,DPLQSDLQ¶ LVVHOI-
evident and immediate ± even though WKH IRUPHUDVZHOODV WKH ODWWHU LQYROYH µIDFWV
DERXW XV¶ UDWKHU WKDQ WKH ZRUOG RXWVLGH XV" ,W VHHPV LPSODXVLEOH WKDW LQ WKH
WUDQVFHQGHQWDOFDVHZHKDYHVRPHVRUWRISULYLOHJHGµILUVWSHUVRQDFFHVV¶RIWKHVRUW
that might be used to establish a relevant epistemic difference in the non-
WUDQVFHQGHQWDOFDVHEHWZHHQµ,DPLQSDLQ¶DQGµ<RXDUHLQSDLQ¶DVZKDWLVLQYROYHG
in the transcendental case is not introspection but the use of modal intuition. Once 
again, therefore, there seems no reason to support StURXG¶V YLHZ FRQFHUQLQJ WKH
asymmetry between ambitious and modest transcendental arguments, and so his 
claims for the greater viability of the latter over the former. 
 ,WDSSHDUV WKHQ WKDWZHKDYH OLWWOH UHDVRQ WRDFFHSW6WURXG¶VFRQFHUQV WKDWD
special µEULGJHRIQHFHVVLW\¶ LV QHHGHG LIZHDUH WRPDNH WUDQVFHQGHQWDO FODLPV WKDW
                                                                                                                                            
contingently containing subjects of experience would require thinking of it as contingently containing 
REMHFWLYHSDUWLFXODUVLQGHSHQGHQWRIH[SHULHQFHDVZHOO¶S 
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WDNHXVRXWVLGHµSV\FKRORJLFDOIDFWV¶,I6WURXG¶VSRVLWLRQLVWREHUHMHFWHGLQWKLVZD\
however, does that mean we should go back to conceiving of transcendental 
arguments in more ambitious terms? I do not think so, as I believe there is another 
reason that can be given for modesty, which is more compelling than the one offered 
by Stroud. 
 
 
 
II 
 
This argument for modesty is really rather simple, and relates to the dialectic with the 
sceptic. The central thought is this: It is implausible to think that the sceptic would be 
satisfied with the use of any transcendental argument against him, given what has 
driven him to be a sceptic in the first place. We must either prevent him being driven 
to scepticism at some earlier point, in which case an appeal to transcendental 
arguments will be unnecessary; or we must accept that we cannot so prevent this, but 
by then a transcendental argument will come too late. 
 In order to see this, let me begin by characterising the sort of sceptic that an 
ambitious transcendental argument is supposed to convince, where I will focus on the 
problem of the external world. This sceptic is someone who has her reasons for 
doubting the truth of what most (or maybe all) of us believe we know: namely, that 
there is an external world of material objects outside us in space and time. This doubt 
is based on the thought that the kind of evidence we would present in favour of this 
knowledge is inadequate, where I take it that a large part of that evidence is 
perceptual. There are of course a number of arguments that the sceptic thinks she can 
give to show that this evidence is inadequate in this way, but most hinge on some sort 
of argument from error: we just cannot be sure that this evidence is sufficient to 
support our belief, given the compatibility of that evidence with various so-called 
µVFHSWLFDOVFHQDULRV¶VXFKDV'HVFDUWHV¶HYLOGHPRQRUWKHEUDLQ-in-a-vat hypothesis. 
 Now, it can be tempting to think that a transcendental argument is just what 
we need here, because it can seem that our difficulty is a fallibilist one: we must admit 
to the sceptic that our perceptual experience is fallible, so we cannot rule out the 
sceptical scenario on the basis of how things appear to us, as that appearance could be 
radically misleading. If the transcendental argument can be made to work, however, it 
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has the advantage of being a deductive strategy, and thus error-proof ± where it can be 
taken for granted that a sceptic who questions our reliance on the laws of logic has 
taken a step too far, even for a sceptic. 
 The difficulty, however, is that while a transcendental argument is indeed a 
deductive argument, it relies on certain premises which involve modal claims, about 
the world having to be a certain way in order for our experiences or thoughts to be 
possible. The question is, therefore, how can we satisfy the sceptic of our entitlement 
to make such modal claims? 
 Now, as much of the recent literature in this area suggests, our capacity to 
make such claims is somewhat mysterious ± so mysterious, in fact, that even some 
who are not in any way sceptics would argue that we should eschew them.8 However, 
my point here is not that general: let us assume that we do make such claims in a way 
that can be satisfactorily understood, so that we should have no doubts about their 
legitimacy on that score. Nonetheless, my worry is that if transcendental arguments 
rely on these modal claims, it is hard to see how they could then put us in a 
dialectically advantageous position with respect to the sceptic: for if the sceptic thinks 
VKHFDQTXHVWLRQRXUSHUFHSWXDOHYLGHQFHIRUWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQH[WHUQDOZRUOGFDQ¶W
she on very similar grounds question our modal intuitions for such claims of necessity 
± viz. that they are equally prone to error? For if (as seems plausible) we rely on 
FULWHULDOLNHFRQFHLYDELOLW\RULPDJLQDELOLW\WRWHVWVXFKPRGDOFODLPVFDQ¶WWKHVFHSWLF
plausibly say that our capacities here can go wrong, to the same degree as in the 
perceptual case ± so how can the use of such claims make us better off? 
 One way to respond to a worry of this kind has been suggested recently by 
Thomas Grundmann and Catrin Misselhorn. They have argued that although a 
transcendental argument relies on our modal intuitions, this is not problematic, 
because the sceptic relies on such intuitions as well, in claiming that her sceptical 
VFHQDULR LV PHWDSK\VLFDOO\ SRVVLEOH 7KH\ ZULWH µ,I WKH VFHSWLF FODLPV WKDW PRGDO
intuitions are unreliable, sceptical hypotheses could not be justified. For this reason, 
WKHVFHSWLFPXVWJUDQWWKHUHOLDELOLW\RIPRGDOLQWXLWLRQVDVDPHWKRGRIMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶
(Grundmann and Misselhorn 2003: 211). Thus, Grundmann and Misselhorn think 
they can get our modal intuitions to speDN LQ IDYRXU RI D FODLP OLNH µ1HFHVVDULO\
SHUFHSWXDOEHOLHIVDERXW WKHH[WHUQDOZRUOGDUHODUJHO\WUXH¶ZKLFKFDQWKHQEHXVHG
                                                 
8
 The literature in this area is growing steadily. For a useful collection with a good selection of articles, 
see Gendler and Hawthorne 2002. 
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as a premise of a transcendental argument to the effect that we have perceptual 
knowledge of the external world, in a way that refutes the sceptic in an ambitious 
manner (cf. Grundmann and Misselhorn 2003: 207). 
 This is an interesting approach; I am not sure, however, that it properly does 
justice to the dialectic with the sceptic. It is certainly true that in appealing to sceptical 
scenarios, the sceptic tries to exploit the fact that he can make them seem 
metaphysically possible to us, where he uses our modal intuitions to do so. Thus, 
when our intuitions are going his way, so to speak, he is happy to exploit them. But 
suppose that Grundmann and Misselhorn are right, and that our intuitions can be made 
WRJRWKHRWKHUZD\LQVXSSRUWRIDFODLPOLNHµ1HFHVVDULO\SHUFHSWXDOEHOLHIVDERXW
WKHH[WHUQDOZRUOGDUHODUJHO\WUXH¶:KDWLVWRSUHYHQWWKHVFHSWLFQRZFKDQJLQJKLV
tune, and questioning our reliance on these intuitions? The sceptic, after all, is not 
someone with a settled position of his own to support: he will use whatever means are 
at his disposal to generate doubt ± and if it turns out that using our modal intuitions is 
not an effective way to do so, because in the end they do not support his sceptical 
VFHQDULRVZK\VKRXOGQ¶WKHDEDQGRQWKHP" 
 Of course, if he gives up appealing to his sceptical scenarios, the sceptic will 
still need something to base his doubt upon, and thus will now need some reason to 
TXHVWLRQ *UXQGPDQQ DQG 0LVVHOKRUQ¶V WUDQVFHQGHQWDO DUJXPHQW DQG WKH PRGDO
intuitions it relies upon. But we have already seen what the ground of that doubt could 
be: namely, the claim that there is a possibility of error in the intuitions they use in 
support of their modal claim, such that the proof must remain open to question. 
 Now, Grundmann and Misselhorn might reasonably respond to this by saying: 
all this sceptical argument amounts to is an argument from fallibilismDQGWKDWµ>L@WLV
JHQHUDOO\ DFFHSWHG WKDW IDOOLELOLVP LV QRW VXIILFLHQW WR JHQHUDWH VFHSWLFLVP¶
(Grundmann and Misselhorn 2003: 210), so the mere fact that our modal intuitions 
about this modal claim might be wrong is not a reason to doubt it ± the sceptic has to 
KDYHµSURSHUPRGDOLQWXLWLRQVVSHDNLQJDJDLQVWLWDQGDVZHKDYHDUJXHGWKHVFHSWLF
KDVQRWSURYLGHGFRQYLQFLQJPRGDOHYLGHQFHIRUKLVFODLPVRIDU¶ *UXQGPDQQDQG
Misselhorn: 218). 
 However, if we adopt this sort of strategy in defence of the use of 
transcendental arguments, what is to prevent us adopting it from the beginning of our 
GHEDWH ZLWK WKH VFHSWLF DQG DSSO\ LW WR WKH SHUFHSWXDO FDVH WKDW LV ZK\ FDQ¶W ZH
dismiss merely fallibilistic arguments against our perceptual evidence for the 
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H[LVWHQFHRIWKHH[WHUQDOZRUOGDQGDVNWKHVFHSWLFWRFRPHXSZLWKµSURSHUHYLGHQFH
VSHDNLQJDJDLQVWLW¶± for example, that there are brains-in-vats experiments going on, 
that scientists are available to conduct such experiments, and so on? In the absence of 
VXFK HYLGHQFH ZK\ ZRQ¶W WKH µVWUDLJKW¶ SHUFHSWXDO HYLGHQFH WKDW ZH KDYH IRU WKH
existence of an external world do ± making any appeal to a transcendental argument 
redundant in our response to the external world sceptic? To put this in the Reidian 
terms of my epigraph, by trying to use a transcendental argument against the sceptic, 
DUHQ¶WZHGRLQJZKDWQRVDQHPDQVKRXOG" 
 I think similar considerations would tell against another way of using 
transcendental arguments ambitiously. This would be to use them not in support of 
claims about the world in the face of arguments from error, but in support of claims 
about the reliability of our belief-forming methods, in the face of arguments from 
circularity ± namely, we must presuppose such methods in order to establish their 
reliability.9 Either we should block such scepticism from the beginning,10 or the 
transcendental argument comes too late: for if we offer a transcendental argument to 
the effect that (for example) perceptual experience is reliable, as this reliability is a 
condition for something else, the question remains, how can we establish the 
reliability of the modal intuitions we employ in constructing the transcendental 
argument? Once again, therefore, it would seem that an appeal to transcendental 
arguments will not help in this situation. 
 If I am right, then, it turns out that there is no reason to think that the use of 
transcendental arguments gives us any advantage over the sceptic as he has been 
conceived so far: either he can be defeated some other way,11 or if not, transcendental 
arguments gives us no additional advantage against him. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 For a useful discussion of the issues, see Alston 1993. 
10
 For an attempt to do so, see Stern 2003: 229-32. 
11
 Stroud, however, is not in a position to accept the argument against ambitious transcendental 
arguments sketched in this section, which is perhaps why he resorts to the argument against them 
RXWOLQHGLQVHFWLRQ,)RUZKLOHKHDFFHSWVWKDWLWLVDFHQWUDOIHDWXUHRIWKHVFHSWLF¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWKH
raises doubts based on possibilities for which no ground can be given, Stroud thinks we cannot reject 
VFHSWLFLVPVLPSO\RQWKDWVFRUHDVZHFRXOGLQWKHFDVHRIµRUGLQDU\¶LQTXLULHV± ZKHUHWKHVFHSWLF¶V
µH[WUDRUGLQDULQHVV¶LVRQ6WURXG¶VYLHZDFRUROODU\RIWKHµH[WUDRUGLQDULQHVV¶RIWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDO
project itself. Ultimately, then, Stroud counsels that we should not try to answer the sceptic, but 
TXHVWLRQWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDOSURMHFWWKDWPDNHVVFHSWLFLVPSRVVLEOH6HHIRUH[DPSOHµ7DNLQJ
6FHSWLFLVP6HULRXVO\¶DQGµ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ+XPDQ.QRZOHGJHLQ*HQHUDO¶ERWKUHSULQWed in Stroud 
2000. 
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III 
 
It might be argued, however, that weaknesses in the kind of non-transcendental, 
fallibilistic response I have given to the sceptic will lead to ambitious transcendental 
arguments being required after all. For, it could be said, these fallibilistic responses 
work by claiming that because the sceptic cannot give us any grounds for actually 
taking his sceptical scenario seriously and thinking that we are brains in vats etc., 
these scenarios pose no epistemic threat to our ordinary beliefs, as if they are mere 
logical possibilities, they do not provide us with sufficient reasons for doubting those 
beliefs. However, the sceptic could respond by arguing that even if he cannot give us 
any reasons for thinking that his sceptical scenarios are actually the case, they are still 
a threat, despite the fact that he cannot provide any evidence in their favour. I will 
here consider three sceptical strategies that might seem to undercut the fallibilist 
response to scepticism in this way, and whether or not these strategies require us to 
appeal to ambitious transcendental arguments if we are to deal with them. 
 A first sceptical strategy that seems to require no positive evidence in favour 
of the sceptical scenario I will call the simple tracking argument. On this strategy, it is 
FODLPHGWKDWWKHVFHSWLFDOVFHQDULRVVKRZWKDWDEHOLHIOLNHµ,KDYHWZRKDQGV¶IDLOVWR
meet a fundamental tracking or sensitivity requirement on knowledge: viz. that if p 
was false, A would not believe that p. To show that I would fail to meet this 
UHTXLUHPHQWIRUNQRZLQJµ,KDYHWZRKDQGV¶WKHVFHSWLFGRHVQRWKDYHWRVKRZWKDWLW
is false or that I have good reason to think it is because I have good reason to think I 
am a brain in a vat: he just has to show that if I were a brain in a vat, it would be false, 
EXW,ZRXOGFRQWLQXHWREHOLHYHLWWKHUHE\VKRZLQJKHDUJXHVWKDWP\EHOLHIµ,KDYH
WZRKDQGV¶YLRODWHVWKHWUDFNLQJUHTXLUHPHQWIRUNQRZOHGge. 
 In the face of this sceptical position, it may seem tempting and indeed 
obligatory to return to some sort of ambitious transcendental argument. For, in 
response to the tracking problem, it could be claimed on the basis of such an argument 
(of the sort suggested by Putnam, for example),12 that the sceptic is wrong to suggest 
WKDWLQWKHVFHSWLFDOVFHQDULRP\EHOLHIµ,KDYHWZRKDQGV¶ZRXOGIDLOWRWUDFNWKHWUXWK
                                                 
12
 See Putnam 1981: Chap 1. Putnam himself takes as his target the very coherence of the sceptical 
hypothesis; but I am here suggesting that some of his claims about reference could also be used to 
resolve the tracking problem, on the groXQGVWKDWLI,ZHUHDEUDLQLQDYDWP\EHOLHIµ,KDYHKDQGV¶
ZRXOGKDYHDGLIIHUHQWµYDWWHG¶PHDQLQJDQGVRQRWIDLOWRWUDFNKRZWKLQJVDUHEHFDXVHKRZWKLQJVDUH
would shape the content of my belief. 
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because I could not be a brain in a vat while still believing that I have hands, as my 
belief would have a different reference, so that the tracking condition on this belief 
(and others like it) can be guaranteed not to fail in this manner. 
 In fact, however, I think the fallibilist has a perfectly adequate response to the 
sceptic here, without recourse to any ambitious transcendental argument of this kind. 
2IFRXUVH LI WKH IDOOLELOLVW LV QRW WR DYDLO KLPVHOIRI DQ DUJXPHQW OLNH3XWQDP¶V KH
must allow that if he were a brain in a vat, he would continue to believe that he has 
hands, and thus that the tracking requirement would fail in this respect. But the 
question here is whether it is a plausible condition on knowledge that if p were false, 
A would not believe that p in all situations in which p might be false? What makes it 
implausible that this condition holds is precisely what makes infallibilism 
implausible: namely, that we can know things, even when our grounds for knowing 
them or our methods for knowing them are prone to lead to error in some 
circumstances. What matters, of course, is in what circumstances we are prone to 
error: if we are error-prone in circumstances that would require a lot of manipulation13 
in order for us to make the error (such as would be needed to make the brain in a vat 
scenario work) then the fact that we could not track the truth in these circumstances 
arguably does not count against our knowing the truth in more normal ones. Rather 
than telling against fallibilism, therefore, all the tracking objection reveals is one of its 
consequences, namely that knowledge does not require a logical entailment between 
not-p and A not believing p:14 it all depends on how and why that relation breaks 
down, where it can be claimed that in the case of the sceptical scenario, that 
breakdown would not be enough to show that our capacity WRWUDFNµ,KDYHWZRKDQGV¶
is inadequate for knowledge. 
 It appears, then, that the simple tracking argument can be defeated without any 
need to appeal to an ambitious transcendental argument. However, this strategy 
IRFXVHG RQ RXU EHOLHI µ, KDYH WZR KDQGV¶ DQG GLUHFWO\ FODLPHG LPSODXVLEO\ DV LW
turned out) that that belief fails to meet the tracking requirement, because it would not 
                                                 
13
 There are different ways this idea could be worked out. One could be in terms of possible worlds, 
namely, that is only in worlds some distance from the actual one that we will be fooled. Another way 
might be in terms of normal functioning, namely, our cognitive mechanisms would require serious 
distortion IRUXVWREHPLVOHG$QGRIFRXUVHGHSHQGLQJKRZµQRUPDOIXQFWLRQLQJ¶LVVSHOWRXWWKHVH
approaches may end up converging. 
14
 &I1R]LFNZKRREVHUYHVWKDWWKHWUDFNLQJFRQGLWLRQZHKDYHEHHQFRQVLGHULQJµGRHVQRW
say that in all possible situations in which not-p KROGV6GRHVQ¶WEHOLHYHp. To say there is no possible 
situation in which not-p yet S believes p, would be to say that not-p entails not-(S believes p), or 
ORJLFDOO\LPSOLHVLW¶ 
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do so in a sceptical scenario. However, the sceptic might now offer a more complex 
tracking argument, which I will call the tracking plus closure argument. Rather than 
IRFXVLQJRQWKHEHOLHIµ,KDYHWZRKDQGV¶ WKLVDUJXPHQWIRFXVHVRQWKHEHOLHIµ,DP
QRWDEUDLQLQDYDW¶DQGFODLPVWKDW this fails the tracking argument; it then follows 
IURPWKHFORVXUHSULQFLSOHWKDWµ,KDYHWZRKDQGV¶LVQRWNQRZQ 
 The first step in this strategy, then, is to claim that I do not know I am not a 
brain in a vat because this belief fails to track: if I were a brain in a vat, I would still 
EHOLHYH,DPQRW%XWZK\FDQ¶WZHUHVSRQGWRWKLVVFHptical point as before: namely, 
ZK\FDQ¶WWKHEHOLHIµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQDYDW¶EHVDLGWRRQO\IDLOWRWUDFNWKDWLWLV
IDOVHLQH[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVQDPHO\ZKHQZHDUHHQYDWWHGMXVWDVWKHEHOLHIµ,
KDYH WZR KDQGV¶ RQO\ IDLOV WR WUDFN WKH WUXWK Ln such circumstances? If this failure 
GRHVQ¶WSUHYHQWXVNQRZLQJZHKDYHKDQGVLQWKHODWWHUFDVHKRZGRHVLWSUHYHQWXV
knowing that we are not brains in vats in the former? However, I think there is 
something different in the brain in a vat case which blocks this sort of response: for, 
ZKLOHWKHUHDUHFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQZKLFK,ZRXOGWUDFNWKHIDOVLW\RIµ,KDYHWZRKDQGV¶
(for example, if they were chopped off in an accident, or as a result of disastrously 
incompetent surgery) but just fail to do so in extreme circumstances like being 
envatted, the sceptic can claim that there are no circumstances in which I would track 
WKHIDOVLW\RIµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQDYDW¶± because if it were false, and so I was a brain 
in a vat, then ex hypothesi I would never pick this up and so never change my belief 
accordingly.15 Thus, while an externalist might say that in both cases my belief only 
fails to track in a remote possible world, I would be prepared to grant the sceptic that 
these beliefs are not on a par, and that a successful tracking argument can be made 
DJDLQVWP\EHOLHIµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQDYDW¶ 
 The second step of the sceptical argument is then to go from this admission to 
the conclusion that I do not know I have two hands, via the closure principle: if A 
knows p, and A knows that p entails q, then A knows q. Using modus tollens on this 
SULQFLSOH LWFDQEHDUJXHGWKDWDVZHGRQ¶WNQRZZHDUHQRWEUDLQV LQYDWV WKHQZH
GRQ¶WNQRZZHKDYHWZRKDQGVHLWKHUDVLWVHHPVULJKWWRVD\WKDWLIZHKDYHKDQGV
this entails we are not brains in vats). It would seem, then, that even without giving us 
                                                 
15
 So, it will not do here to say that I might come to pLFNXSWKHIDOVLW\RIµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQDYDW¶LQ
some circumstances, for example if the evil scientist were not very competent and sent me some 
LQIRUPDWLRQWKDWWLSSHGPHRII,DPWDNLQJLWWKDWLWLVSDUWRIWKHVFHSWLF¶Vconception of what it is to 
be a brain in a vat that the scientists concerned never make such errors. If such malevolent perfection 
seems implausible to attribute to human scientists, substitute evil demon scientists instead.  
 13 
any reason to think we actually are brains in vats, the sceptic can use his scenario to 
undermine our ordinary beliefs, such as the belief that we have hands. 
 Now, of course, there are a variety of responses to this problem in the 
literature which do not employ any sort of transcendental argument strategy, such as 
approaches that deny the closure principle, or that reject the tracking requirement on 
knowledge, replacing it wLWKDZHDNHUUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWRXUEHOLHIµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQ
D YDW¶ FDQ EH VDLG WR PHHW16 The fallibilist can therefore explore ways out of this 
difficulty without being obliged to adopt a transcendental argument. But still, it might 
be suggested, if a transcendental argument can be used against the sceptic here 
without requiring any such manoeuvres, that might seem to show that transcendental 
arguments have a significant role to play against the sceptic in enabling us to answer 
him without modifying what appear to many to be plausible epistemic principles. 
 I would once again claim, however, that the promise of transcendental 
arguments in this respect is once again illusory. It may seem that the way in which 
such an argument could be used is in relation to the tracking issue. For, it could be 
VDLGDUJXPHQWVVXFKDV3XWQDP¶VVKRZWKDWWKHWUDFNLQJUHTXLUHPHQWIRUµ,DPQRWD
EUDLQ LQ D YDW¶ FDQ EH PHW E\ VKRZLQJ WKDW WKLV LV VRPHWKLQJ ZH FRXOG QRW IDOVHO\
believe: for, if I were a brain in a vat, thinking µ, DPQRWDEUDLQ LQYDW¶ZRXOGQRW
refer to brains in vats but something else (perhaps vat images).17 The difficulty is, 
however, that although this sort of transcendental argument meets the tracking 
requirement, it can nonetheless be plausibly claimed that there are further conditions 
LWGRHVQRWPHHW)RULWGRHVQ¶WVKRZZKDWDOVRVHHPVWREHQHHGHGZKLFKLVWKDWWKH
JURXQGVRQZKLFKZHIRUPWKHEHOLHIµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQDYDW¶GRQRWSUHYHQWXVIURP
believing it when it is false; the transcendental argument just shows that semantic 
H[WHUQDOLVWFRQGLWLRQVRQUHIHUHQFHPDNHLWLPSRVVLEOHWREHOLHYHµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQD
YDW¶IDOVHO\PXFKDVSK\VLFDOFRQGLWLRQVRQEHOLHIPDNHLWLPSRVVLEOHWREHOLHYHµ,DP
DOLYH¶ RU µ7KHUH LV R[\JHQ LQ WKH URRP¶ IDOVHOy, without in itself showing that the 
grounds we have for that belief are what make us sensitive to its truth and falsity ± 
and this seems to be what is required for knowledge. If I am right, we will therefore 
be obliged to find other ways of responding to the sceptical challenge such as those 
mentioned above, that do not employ transcendental arguments of this sort. 
                                                 
16
 For the former approach, see e.g. Nozick 1981: 197-247, and Dretske 1970. For the latter approach, 
see e.g. Sosa 1999. 
17
 Putnam 1981: 14-15. 
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 The same sort of difficulty applies to another way of using a transcendental 
argument in relation to the tracking issue, which is even stronger than the semantic 
externalist one we have just considered. This would be to try to meet the tracking 
SUREOHPE\XVLQJDWUDQVFHQGHQWDODUJXPHQWWRVKRZWKDWµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQDYDW¶LV
akin to a necessarily true mathematical proposition:18 for, it could be said that the 
sceptical scenario is metaphysically impossible, because we could not be brains in 
vats, as being envatted would prevent us from being believers at all. If this is right, 
then it would seem that the sceptical scenario is necessarily false, as it could never be 
DFWXDOLVHG VR MXVW DV µLI       ZHUH IDOVH¶ LV D QHFHVVDULO\ IDOVH VXSSRVLWLRQ
GRHVQ¶WWKLVVKRZWKDWWKHVDPHLVWUXHRIVXSSRVLQJWKHIDOVLW\RIµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQ
YDW¶" 
 The difficulty here, however, is that all this argument would show is not that 
the tracking requirement has been met E\P\EHOLHI µ,DPQRWDEUDLQ LQDYDW¶EXW
rather that the antecedent of the tracking conditional is necessarily false, as is also the 
case for necessary truths like 2 + 2 = 4; but then, as Nozick has argued, it seems that it 
is best to say not that the tracking requirement has been satisfied and so that our belief 
constitutes knowledge in this respect, but that it is not a requirement at all (Nozick 
1981: 186-1RZRIFRXUVHHYHQLIµ,DPQRWDEUDLQLQDYDW¶FDQQRWWXUQRXWWREH
falsely believed by me, this does not in itself show that I know it, any more than the 
IDFW WKDWµ ¶FDQQRWEHIDOVHO\EHOLHYHGE\PHVKRZV,NQRZLWHLWKHU ,VWLOO
need some adequate grounds for believing each of them, where it is precisely those 
grounds that the sceptic questions, in the transcendental argument case as much as in 
the ordinary perceptual one. We therefore still need to be told why the sceptic should 
WDNHWKHWUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVW¶VUHDVons for believing he is not a brain a vat more seriously 
than the non-WUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVW¶V 
 Finally, we can consider a third sceptical strategy that again treats the sceptical 
scenario as a mere possibility, which might be called the priority argument. Here, the 
sceptic claims that there must be a certain order to our knowledge, such that to know 
IDPLOLDU WKLQJV OLNH µ,KDYH WZRKDQGV¶ ,PXVW already know WKLQJV OLNH µ, DPQRWD
EUDLQLQDYDW¶%XWWKHQWKHVFHSWLFDUJXHVRQZKDWJURXQGVFRXOG,NQRZWKDt I am 
not a brain in a vat, if all the empirical premises from which I might infer this can 
only be accepted after the hypothesis has been refuted? Unless we are prepared to 
                                                 
18
 2IFRXUVHLWFDQ¶WEHH[DFWO\WKHVDPHDV,GRQRWH[LVWLQDOOSRVVLEOHZRUOGVZKHUHDVQXPEHUV
(arguably) do. 
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follow G. E. Moore, and argue from these empirical premises directly against the 
sceptical hypothesis, it seems like we are required to argue against it while being 
deprived of any basis on which to do so, where again the sceptic here does not need to 
provide any positive evidence in its favour in order to make his case. 
 Once again, in the face of this difficulty, it may seem that only something like 
an ambitious transcendental argument can give us what is needed: for, it gives us an 
argument against the sceptical scenario which is a priori, and which can therefore be 
used to first show that we are not brains in a vat, in a way that seemed to be required 
before we could lay claim to any of our ordinary empirical knowledge. We might 
therefore grant the sceptical suggestion that we must know that we are not brains in 
vats before we can know that we have hands etc., but employ a transcendental 
argument to show that this requirement can be met.  
However, the problem with this way of using transcendental arguments is that 
WKHVFHSWLF¶VSULRULW\DUJXPHQWLVOHVVWKDQFRPSHOOLQJGHVSLWHEHLQJplausible on the 
surface. For, the crucial move is to say that we cannot know an empirical proposition 
OLNHµ,KDYHWZRKDQGV¶XQOHVVZHDOUHDG\NQRZWKDWWKHVFHSWLFDOK\SRWKHVLVLVIDOVH
and can rule it out. But why should we accept this move? Consider the following 
propositions: 
 a: my copy of War and Peace is in my study 
and 
 b: my copy of War and Peace has not been stolen. 
Do I have to have evidence for b before I can come to know a? The answer would 
seem to depend on the circumstances. If I already know (or have reason to believe) 
that a lot of stealing of Russian classics has been going on, then even if I clearly 
remember putting War and Peace in my study this morning, have a generally good 
memory etc., that may not be sufficient grounds for knowing a, unless I am in a 
position to rule out b. But in different circumstances, where as far as I know stealing 
of this sort never or very rarely happens, why must I establish b before my evidence 
for a can be accepted? It seems to me this is not required; and of course, the fallibilist 
argues that we find ourselves in this latter situation when it comes to the sceptical 
scenario, where we have no grounds for believing this scenario to hold. If this is the 
right approach to take (as I believe it is) it undercuts the need to argue against the 
sceptical scenario in an a priori manner using a transcendental argument as a first 
step: we can just claim (as before) that the lack of evidence for the sceptical scenario 
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is sufficient to justify us in accepting our ordinary empirical beliefs for the usual 
reasons, such as perceptual evidence, memory, testimony and so on. 
 
 
IV 
 
It appears, then, for reasons rather different from those presented by Stroud, but more 
to do with the dialectical situation involved in our debate with the sceptic, that 
ambitious transcendental arguments have little work to do. 
 Does that mean that all forms of transcendental argument have little work to 
do however ± modest ones included? I would suggest not.19 For, while it turns out that 
transcendental arguments have little to add in the battle against the external world 
sceptic who thinks our perceptual evidence is insufficient because error-prone, this is 
not the only way to be an external world sceptic. For example, one can argue that the 
perceptual content of our experience does not tell us anything about an external world 
as we believe it to be, but that we get such beliefs by inferring from a more 
LPSRYHULVKHGSHUFHSWXDOFRQWHQWDVRQ+XPH¶VYLHZWKDWµ¶7LVFRPPRQO\DOORZ¶GE\
philosophers, that all bodies, which discover themselves to the eye, appear as if 
painted on a plain surface, and that their different degrees of remoteness from 
RXUVHOYHVDUHGLVFRYHU¶GPRUHE\UHDVRQWKDWWKHVHQVHV¶>+XPH@ZKHUHWKH
issue then is how such inferences can be justified. In this situation, I have argued 
elsewhere,20 a transcendental argument that concerns merely the perceptual content of 
our experience (how things appear to us) can be useful, in making our beliefs 
concerning the external world direct and perceptual rather than indirect and 
inferential.  
Now, if we adopt a target of this kind for our transcendental argument, I think 
we can avoid the dialectical difficulty we faced previously. Previously, it seemed 
dialectically inappropriate to use modal claims against the sceptic who argues from 
error, when the grounds for making such claims seem at least as vulnerable to error as 
the empirical grounds (such as perceptual experience) that these claims are supposed 
to replace; but there is less dialectical incongruity in making transcendental claims 
against the kind of sceptic I have just sketched. For in the latter case, we really are in 
                                                 
19
 For further discussion see Stern 2000. 
20
 See Stern 2000: Chap 4. 
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the sort of situation viz-à-viz the sceptic that Grundmann and Misselhorn hoped we 
were in previously, as the sceptic is interested in doing more than offer a mere 
argument from error and fallibility to question our belief; she is trying to show not 
just that our evidence is fallible, but that the belief is not justified in our own terms, 
given the problematic nature of the inference from how she takes things to appear to 
XV WR KRZ ZH WKLQN WKH\ DUH ZKHUH WKH µYHLO RI DSSHDUDQFHV¶ VHHPV WR PHDQ WKDW
µUHDVRQ¶ FRXOG QRW KDYH HQRXJK WR JR RQ LQ PDNLQJ DQ\ VXFK LQIHUHQFH 6LPLODUO\
therefore, the sceptic must do more than just offer an argument from fallibility against 
a transcendental claim that how things appear to us must be rich enough to support 
our belief in the external world on direct perceptual grounds (for example, contra 
Hume, that the world is immediately presented to us in three dimensions, so that this 
LVQRWµGLVFRYHU¶GPRUHE\UHDVRQWKDWWKHVHQVHV¶LQVWHDGKHPXVWJLYHXVJURXQGV
for thinking that this claim is not properly supported by our modal intuitions, where 
then he must show that experience on his impoverished model would be sufficient to 
be a condition for us to be the kind of conscious creatures we are, contra our 
transcendental argument against him. The sceptic is thus not in a position to make a 
general argument against our reliance on our modal intuitions to support our 
transcendental claim about how our perceptual experience must be, so if our intuitions 
can be made to speak in favour of this claim, he cannot shrug them off as he did 
previously, but must show why in this case our intuitions are in fact mistaken, or can 
be made to go the other way. The dialectic of this situation, then, gives the 
transcendental argument some genuine work to do, with some prospect of success ± 
but only a transcendental argument of a modest kind. 
 If I am right, however, that a transcendental argument can only be used 
successfully in this modest way, against this form of sceptic, what about the sceptic of 
the more radical kind, who argues from various sceptical scenarios, and against whom 
it seemed that an ambitious transcendental argument might be needed? If we have 
abandoned the latter form of argument, does this sceptic therefore win the day? And if 
VRLIZHXVHDWUDQVFHQGHQWDODUJXPHQWWRGHIHDWWKHPRUHPRGHVWVFHSWLFFDQ¶WVKH
remain a sceptic by turning more radical? 
 In abandoning the use of an ambitious transcendental argument against the 
radical sceptic, however, all that was claimed was that there is no reason to think 
these arguments should be any more successful than approaches that do not use such 
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arguments, some of which have been mentioned above.21 Thankfully, therefore, if I 
am right to say that we must live without ambitious transcendental arguments at this 
level, and be content to settle for modesty, I think it is also right to say that we can do 
so without conceding defeat to the sceptic, of either the more modest or the more 
radical kind.22 
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